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Abstract
Inspired by the Chinese experience, we develop a Schumpeterian growth model of
distance to frontier in which economic growth in the developing country is driven by
domestic innovation as well as imitation and transfer of foreign technologies through
foreign direct investment. We show that optimal intellectual property rights (IPR)
protection is stage-dependent. At an early stage of development, the country imple-
ments weak IPR protection to facilitate imitation. At a later stage of development, the
country implements strong IPR protection to encourage domestic innovation. We also
calibrate the model to aggregate data of the Chinese economy to simulate the optimal
path of patent strength, which is increasing as the country evolves towards the world
technology frontier.
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"China and others are entering the tricky middle-income stage of development in
which the big advances from absorbing rich-world technology start to run out."
The Economist (2011)1
1 Introduction
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the implementation of a modern intellectual property
rights (IPR) system in China was subject to intense debates.2 Proponents including Deng
Xiaopeng, the paramount leader of China at that time, saw the creation of a modern IPR
system in China as a necessary means to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and to
provide incentives for domestic innovation. In 1982, the rst intellectual property law under
the leadership of Deng was drafted in China. Then, through a series of policy reforms, the
strength of patent rights in China increased over time. For example, the Ginarte-Park index
of patent rights in China gradually increased from 1.33 in 1985 to 4.08 in 2005.3 In 1992,
the statutory term of patent in China was lengthened from 15 years to 20 years.4 Then, in
compliance with the TRIPS agreement,5 China reformed its patent system again in 2000.6
Recently, the Third Amendment to the Chinese Patent Law was approved in December 2008
and came into e¤ect in October 2009 with the objective of building China into an innovative
country with well-protected IPR by 2020.7 In addition to strengthening patent rights, China
also improved the protection for trade secrets by developing a comprehensive set of laws
and regulations over the last two decades.8 In a recent report issued by NERA Economic
Consulting, Sepetys and Cox (2009, p. 3) nicely summarize the evolution of IPR in China
1The Economist, "The world economy: Catching up is very hard to do". September 24th - 30th, 2011.
2See for example Allison and Lin (1999) and La Croix and Konan (2002) for a discussion on the historical
development of IPR in China.
3The Ginarte-Park index is on a scale of 0 to 5, and a larger number implies stronger patent rights. See
Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008a) for a detailed description of this patent index.
4As for the term of patent for utility model and design patents, it was lengthened from 5 years to 10
years. Also, this patent reform expanded patentable subject matter in China.
5The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is an agreement of
the World Trade Organization (WTO). In summary, TRIPS establishes a minimum level of IPR protection
that must be provided by all member countries.
6The policy changes include (a) providing patentholders with the right to obtain a preliminary injunction
against the infringing party before ling a lawsuit, (b) stipulating standards to compute statutory damages,
(c) a¢ rming that state and non-state enterprises enjoy equal patent rights, and (d) simplifying the patent
application process, examination and transfer procedures and unifying the appeal system. See for example
Hu and Je¤erson (2009) for an empirical analysis on this patent reform in China.
7See for example Yang and Yen (2010) for a review of the policy changes in this third amendment. In
summary, the changes aim at (a) promoting patent applications, (b) encouraging exploitation of jointly owned
patents, (c) heightening patentability requirement, (d) increasing statutory damages and administrative nes,
(e) clarifying the granting of compulsory licenses, and (f) establishing protection for genetic resources.
8See for example Zuber (2008) for a discussion on the protection of trade secrets in China and the US.
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as follows.
In the early stages of development, with limited resources and limited ca-
pacity for research and development, there may be little or no IPR protection.
Domestic industry will be characterized by imitation rather than innovation. Im-
itation allows for low-cost production, low prices for goods and services, and the
stimulation of consumption and employment. A weak IPR regime may support
technological growth and development through imitation in early stages of de-
velopment. At subsequent stages of development, however, a weak IPR regime
discourages domestic innovation. Innovation and technological development are
drivers of economic growth. Economies that succeed in shifting into knowledge-
based production are characterized by domestic innovation, typically supported
with well-designed and adequately enforced IPR laws.
In this study, we develop a growth-theoretic model to formalize this insight on the evo-
lution of IPR in developing countries using China as a timely example. For example, one
objective of Chinas twelfth ve-year plan (2011-2015) is to shift its reliance on foreign tech-
nology to domestic innovation. A recent study by Li (2010) provides an interesting case-study
analysis on the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries to demonstrate that China is
in the process of transforming from an imitation-oriented economy to an innovation-oriented
economy and that strengthening patent rights can play an important role in facilitating this
transformation process. This nding is consistent with the implication of our theoretical
analysis.
To analyze stage-dependent IPR for a developing country at di¤erent stages of develop-
ment, we consider a Schumpeterian growth model of distance to frontier in which economic
growth in the developing country is driven by domestic innovation as well as imitation and
transfer of foreign technologies through FDI. We show that the model features an inverted-U
e¤ect of patent strength on domestic innovation under a certain parameter space. The intu-
ition is as follows. On the one hand, increasing patent strength has a direct positive e¤ect on
domestic innovation by reducing imitation. On the other hand, the reduction in imitation
leads to an increase in FDI that strengthens the displacement e¤ect of foreign technologies
on domestic innovation. As for the growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing strengths of
IPR protection, we show that they are stage-dependent. At an early stage of development,
the country implements weak IPR protection to facilitate imitation of foreign technologies.
At a later stage of development, the country implements strong IPR protection to encourage
domestic innovation. Finally, we also calibrate the model to aggregate data of the Chinese
economy to simulate the optimal path of patent strength, which is increasing as the country
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evolves towards the world technology frontier, and this result is consistent with the actual
evolution of the patent system in China.
This study relates to the literature on IPR and economic growth. This literature focuses
on an important issue that is optimal IPR protection. An early study by Nordhaus (1969)
nds that the optimal patent length should balance between static distortionary e¤ects
of markup pricing and dynamic gains from enhanced innovation. In a dynamic general-
equilibrium model, Judd (1985) nds that the optimal patent length is innite while Iwaisako
and Futagami (2003) and Futagami and Iwaisako (2007) nd that the optimal patent length
can be nite in a version of the Romer model. Kwan and Lai (2003) show that extending
the e¤ective lifetime of patent would lead to a substantial increase in R&D and welfare
whereas Li (2001) and ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) consider the e¤ects of patent
breadth on R&D and economic growth. Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007) and Davis and
Sener (2011) analyze the e¤ects of rent protection activities on innovation. Chu (2009)
analyzes the e¤ects of blocking patents on R&D and welfare. Recently, Acemoglu and
Akcigit (2011) consider optimal state-dependent patent protection based on the endogenous
technological gap between the leader and followers in an industry. However, this literature
rarely considers optimal IPR protection in developing countries in which economic growth is
driven by imitation and transfer of foreign technologies in addition to domestic innovation.
We ll this gap in the literature by analyzing the optimal strength of IPR protection in a
developing country at di¤erent stages of economic development.
Our study also relates to the literature on IPR and North-South product cycles.9 A
key question in this literature is whether strengthening Southern IPR protection would
stimulate or stie Northern innovation. Grossman and Helpman (1991) develop a North-
South product-cycle model and nd that strengthening Southern IPR protection either has
no e¤ect or a surprisingly negative e¤ect on Northern innovation.10 Lai (1998) shows that
whether Southern IPR protection has a positive or negative e¤ect on Northern innovation
depends on the mode of technology transfer (i.e., imitation versus FDI) while Glass and
Wu (2007) argue that the e¤ect also depends on the type of technological innovation (i.e.,
quality improvement versus variety expansion). Instead of analyzing the e¤ects of Southern
IPR protection on Northern innovation, the present study considers a much less explored
issue that is optimal IPR protection in the South as a function of its technology distance
from the North.
9See for example Grossman and Helpman (1991), Helpman (1993), Lai (1998), Yang and Maskus (2001),
Glass and Saggi (2002a, 2002b), Glass and Wu (2007), Tanaka et al. (2007), Parello (2008), Dinopoulos and
Segerstrom (2010), Branstetter and Saggi (2011) and Iwaisako et al. (2011).
10Grossman and Helpman (1991) consider a tax (subsidy) on imitation that decreases (increases) Southern
imitation, which is similar to the e¤ects of IPR protection.
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An inuential study by Grossman and Lai (2004) considers globally optimal IPR protec-
tion in an open-economy model featuring both developed and developing countries that have
asymmetric innovative capability and market size. The present study di¤ers from Gross-
man and Lai (2004) by considering a model in which (a) economic growth in the developing
country is driven by both domestic innovation and foreign technology transfer and (b) the
relative importance of innovation and technology transfer changes endogenously as the coun-
try evolves towards the world technology frontier. These two features together imply that
optimal IPR protection should be stage-dependent, which is an important property that is
absent in all the abovementioned studies.
Finally, this study relates to the literature on distance to frontier and convergence; see
for example Acemoglu et al. (2003, 2006), Aghion et al. (2005), Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes
(2005) and Gersbach et al. (2011). Our study relates to this literature by considering IPR as
a specic economic institution and shows that IPR policy can be an important policy variable
that a¤ects the convergence of developing countries. Finally, our study relates to a recent
study by Wu (2010), who also considers the e¤ects of IPR protection on the convergence of
developing countries using a Schumpeterian model of distance to frontier. While Wu (2010)
focuses on the existence of non-convergence traps, our study di¤ers from his interesting
analysis by characterizing the optimal path of IPR protection in developing countries and
considering multiple channels of foreign technology transfer through FDI and imitation.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents stylized facts. Section
3 describes the theoretical model. Section 4 analyzes stage-dependent IPR protection. Sec-
tion 5 considers two extensions of the baseline model. The nal section concludes with a
discussion.
2 Stylized facts
In this section, we document some stylized facts about the e¤ects of IPR protection on
economic growth. In the empirical literature, it is well known that the growth e¤ects of IPR
protection di¤er across developed and developing countries; see for example Park (2008b) for
a survey. In the following empirical framework, instead of treating developed and developing
countries as separate groups, we use a distance-to-frontier variable to capture the degree of
economic development as a continuous variable and nd that it indeed has an interactive
e¤ect with IPR on economic growth.
Specically, we consider an unbalanced panel from 1970 to 2005 for 92 countries.11 We
11We include all countries that have available data for each variable in at least some years within the
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obtain data on labor productivity relative to the US (i.e., US relative productivity is normal-
ized to one) from the Penn World Table, and this variable, relative labor productivity (RLP),
inversely measures the distance to frontier. To capture the strength of IPR, we consider the
standard Ginarte-Park index of patent rights, which is available with one observation every
5 years for each country. We consider the following empirical specication.
growthi;t+1 = 0 + 1IPRi;t + 2IPRi;t RLPi;t + 3RLPi;t +  i;t + "i;t,
where growthi;t+1 is the growth rate (expressed in percentage points) of GDP in country i one
period later. i;t is a vector of standard control variables including (a) education measured
by the average years of schooling from the Barro-Lee data set, (b) the degree of openness
measured by the sum of export and import over GDP from the Penn World Table, (c) an
index of economic freedom from the annual report of Economic Freedom of the World, (d)
country xed e¤ects and (e) period xed e¤ects. Di¤erentiating growth with respect to IPR,
we have
@growthi;t+1
@IPRi;t
= 1 + 2RLPi;t.
Our main nding is that 1 < 0 and 2 > 0. In other words, for a country that is far
away from the world technology frontier (i.e., a small RLPi;t), the e¤ect of IPR on growth is
negative. For a country that is close to the world technology frontier (i.e., a large RLPi;t),
the e¤ect of IPR on growth becomes positive. In the theoretical analysis, our main result of
stage-dependant optimal IPR policy is based on this important property that the positive
growth e¤ect of IPR strengthens relative to the negative growth e¤ect as a country evolves
towards the technology frontier, for which we provide empirical evidence here.
We have considered a number of estimation techniques. The results are summarized in
Table 1, in which the coe¢ cients of RLP are always negative and signicant, a nding that
is consistent with catching up.
period.
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The rst column of Table 1 reports the coe¢ cients of the country xed e¤ects estimation,
whereas the second column also includes period e¤ects common to all countries. Both country
and period xed e¤ects are jointly signicant with p-value lower than 1%. Similarly, country
dummies are signicant given period dummies, and period dummies are signicant given
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country dummies. We have also performed Hausman tests based on the di¤erence between
xed e¤ects and random e¤ects, which reject the random e¤ects specication at less than
1% signicance. To make sure that qualitative results are not driven by endogeneity, we
have also reported in the third column the 2-stage least square coe¢ cients for which the
instruments are the lagged independent variables. Neither the signs nor the magnitude of
the coe¢ cients change much.
The residuals of all our regressions have been tested for unit root, which is always excluded
at less than 1% signicance. For robustness, we have also added 1-period lagged growth as
an explanatory variable and used the Arellano and Bond GMM two-step estimator, which
yields an autoregressive coe¢ cient for growth equal to 0.161 with a t-statistic of 2.18. As the
reader can see, despite the dynamic panel specication, the coe¢ cients of the explanatory
variables, which are reported in the fourth column of Table 1, are roughly in line with those
of the previous static panel regressions. Therefore, the available evidence seems to suggest
that as a country evolves towards the world technology frontier, the positive growth e¤ect
of IPR strengthens and eventually dominates the negative growth e¤ect.
3 A simple model of distance to frontier
We consider a Schumpeterian growth model of distance to frontier.12 The discrete-time
model has four components (a) individuals, (b) nal goods, (c) intermediate goods, and (d)
R&D. In each period, there is a unit continuum of risk-neutral individuals indexed by j.
Each individual j lives for one period, supplies one unit of labor and consumes nal goods
to maximize expected utility. To facilitate tractable aggregation of social welfare, we follow
a common specication in the literature to consider linear utility given by ujt = E[c
j
t ], where
cjt denotes consumption by individual j. Labor supply is used as an input for nal goods,
which can be consumed by individuals, devoted to various types of R&D activities or used
as an input for intermediate goods. To model the e¤ects of IPR, we consider a specic
IPR parameter t that captures the e¤ects of patent protection on imitation, which in turn
a¤ects FDI and innovation. This setup captures the main concerns of policymakers in China.
A key di¤erence between our model and the models in Acemoglu et al. (2003, 2006)
and Wu (2010) is in our formulation of the interaction between imitation of foreign tech-
nologies and domestic innovation in the developing country. In previous studies, imitation
and innovation in an industry are assumed to be performed by the same rm implying that
12Our model borrows many elements from other Schumpeterian models of distance to frontier, such as
Acemoglu et al. (2003, 2006), Aghion et al. (2005) and Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005).
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the interaction between imitation and innovation lies in the resource allocation across the
two types of activities within a rm. In contrast, in our model, imitation and innovation
in an industry are performed by two di¤erent rms capturing the realistic scenario in which
domestic innovation in the developing country can be displaced by the importation of more
advanced foreign technologies. In other words, our framework captures both the positive
spillover e¤ect and the negative market-stealing e¤ect of foreign technologies on domestic
technologies commonly discussed in the empirical literature on technology di¤usion.13
Another key di¤erence is that we take into consideration two channels of foreign tech-
nology transfer (a) FDI and (b) imitation. Within this framework, a stronger patent system
makes imitation of foreign technologies more di¢ cult. Consequently, the lower intensity of
imitation improves the incentives for technology transfer via FDI, and this theoretical nd-
ing is consistent with empirical evidence.14 As for the e¤ects of stronger patent protection
on domestic innovation, there are a direct positive e¤ect from the decrease in imitation and
an indirect negative e¤ect from the increase in FDI (i.e., the displacement e¤ect of foreign
technologies on domestic innovation). Therefore, our model features an inverted-U e¤ect
of patent strength on domestic innovation that has been documented in recent empirical
studies, such as Lerner (2009) and Qian (2007).15
In the model, we consider a specic sequence of actions by domestic innovators, foreign
rms and domestic imitators. In particular, we assume that domestic innovation is followed
by FDI and then imitation. This specic sequence of actions gives rise to the two important
and realistic implications discussed above. First, domestic innovation may be displaced by
foreign technologies. Second, a strengthening of patent protection that reduces imitation
may encourage both domestic innovation and foreign technology transfer supporting the
abovementioned rationales for implementing a modern IPR system in China.
Finally, as in previous studies, we assume that there is no trade in factors of production
and the developing country takes the world technology frontier as given.16 A slight modi-
cation from previous studies is that we allow for trade in nal goods, so that foreign rms
that perform FDI can retrieve their monopolistic prots out of the developing country.
13See for example Aitken and Harrison (1999).
14An early study by Lee and Manseld (1996) nds a positive e¤ect of IPR on FDI. Although subsequent
studies produce mixed results, recent empirical studies tend to nd a positive e¤ect. For example, Javorcik
(2004) nds that IPR has a positive e¤ect on FDI in technology-intensive sectors of transition economies.
Considering a more comprehensive set of countries, Branstetter et al. (2006) also nd that strengthening
IPR has a positive e¤ect on technology transfer.
15See also Akiyama and Furukawa (2009), Furukawa (2007, 2010), Horii and Iwaisako (2007) and Iwaisako
and Futagami (2011), who derive an inverted-U relationship between patent strength and innovation in the
R&D-based growth model via other mechanisms.
16See Section 6 for a discussion on this assumption.
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3.1 Final goods
This sector is perfectly competitive, and rms take the output and input prices as given.
Final goods Yt (chosen as the numeraire) are produced by combining labor input with a unit
continuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods Xt(i) indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. We consider a
standard production function.
Yt = L
1 
t
Z 1
0
A1 t (i)X

t (i)di, (1)
where At(i) is the level of technology associated with Xt(i). The supply of labor Lt is
normalized to unity for all t. The conditional demand function for Xt(i) is
Xt(i) = At(i) [=Pt(i)]
1=(1 ) , (2)
where Pt(i) is the price of Xt(i) for i 2 [0; 1].
3.2 Intermediate goods and domestic innovation
There is a unit continuum of intermediate goods indexed by i 2 [0; 1], and each industry i is
dominated by a temporary monopolistic leader. In each industry, an individual is randomly
chosen as the entrepreneur, who is given the opportunity to innovate at the beginning of the
period and potentially dominate the industry for the remaining period. In the next period, all
relevant patents expire and the monopolistic position will be randomly assigned to another
entrepreneur who performs the next innovation. This simple setup, which is in line with other
Schumpeterian models of distance to frontier, simplies the model by equating the return
to R&D to the monopolistic prot in the current period, and this simplication allows us to
focus on the dynamic aspects of distance to frontier. For each monopolist, producing one
unit of intermediate goods requires one unit of nal goods. The familiar prot-maximizing
price is Pt(i) = 1=. Therefore, using (2), we can derive the amount of monopolistic prot
as
t(i) = Pt(i)Xt(i) Xt(i) = At(i), (3)
where   (1  )(1+)=(1 ) is a composite parameter.
At the beginning of time t, the level of productivity in industry i is At 1(i). An entrepre-
neur is given the opportunity to increase the level of productivity to eAt(i) = (1+ t)At 1(i),
where t is the step size of innovation that is a choice variable.
17 The expected return to
17It is useful to note that although a domestically invented technology may not be as advanced as foreign
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innovation in industry i is (1   pt)[ eAt(i)   At 1(i)] = (1   pt)tAt 1(i), where pt 2 [0; 1]
is the endogenous probability (to be derived below) that the monopolistic position will be
taken away either by a foreign rm or by a domestic imitator before production in this
period begins. When this probability pt is high, the entrepreneur only has a small chance
of capturing the monopolistic prot and has less incentives to do R&D. This setup relates
to the idea of intellectual appropriability discussed in Cozzi (2001) and Cozzi and Spinesi
(2006). Under this interpretation, pt can be viewed as the probability that the monopolistic
position is stolen by another entrepreneur before the innovator manages to start production.
To increase the level of technology by a step size of t in industry i, the entrepreneur
has to devote Rt(i) units of nal goods to R&D. We consider a simple convex cost function
given by
Rt(i) =
(t)


At 1(i), (4)
where  is a productivity parameter and  > 2.18 In (4), the scaling by At 1(i) is common in
the literature to capture increasing di¢ culty in innovation and to ensure a stationary t on
the balanced-growth path. The expected prot of R&D is (1 pt)tAt 1(i) Rt(i). Simple
di¤erentiation yields the equilibrium step size of innovation given by
t = [(1  pt)]1=( 1) (5)
for i 2 [0; 1]. Equation (5) shows that an increase in pt reduces the incentives for innovation
and decreases t.
Proposition 1 Weaker intellectual appropriability (i.e., a larger pt) decreases the equilib-
rium step size of domestic innovation.
3.3 Foreign direct investment
After the domestic entrepreneurs complete their R&D projects and before they sell their
products, foreign rms may transfer recent technological developments from the world tech-
nology frontier to the developing country. This transfer of foreign technologies via FDI is
technologies, it was nevertheless patentable in China before its third amendment to patent laws when the
novelty requirement for a patentable invention required only local novelty within China. After the recent
passage of this third amendment, patentability in China is now based on global novelty. Nevertheless,
domestic innovators may invent locally adapted inventions that are "su¢ ciently" di¤erent from foreign
inventions and patentable in China.
18This parameter assumption  > 2 ensures that the equilibrium growth rate is concave in pt, so that the
growth-maximizing level of patent protection is an interior solution.
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a random process. If the process is successful in industry i, then the foreign rm takes
away the monopolistic position from the domestic entrepreneur in that industry. Before this
process of technology transfer begins, the level of productivity in industry i at time t iseAt(i) = (1 + t)At 1(i). If the technology transfer succeeds, then productivity in industry i
further increases to bAt(i) = eAt(i) + gAt 1. (6)
At 1 is the level of technology at the world technology frontier at time t   1 and evolves
according to
At = (1 + g
)At 1, (7)
where g is the exogenous growth rate of the world technology frontier. In other words, (6)
considers the case in which the domestic economy imports newly developed frontier technolo-
gies from abroad.19 Although newly developed technologies represent an important source
of technology transfer to developing countries, it is conceivable that previously developed
technologies that have not been adopted by developing countries also represent another im-
portant source of technology transfer. Therefore, we will explore this extension in Section
5.
The expected value of a successful transfer of foreign technologies via FDI in industry i
is (1   ts) bAt(i), where t 2 [0; 1] is the probability that the transferred technologies will
be imitated by a domestic rm in which case the foreign rm has to give away a share
s 2 [0; 1] of the market to the domestic imitator (to be discussed further below). To achieve
a successful FDI project with probability ft in industry i, the foreign rm has to devote Ft(i)
units of nal goods. For analytical simplicity, we consider a quadratic cost function given by
Ft(i) =
(ft)
2
2f
bAt(i), (8)
where f is a productivity parameter. The expected prot of FDI is ft(1  ts) bAt(i) Ft(i).
Simple di¤erentiation yields the equilibrium intensity of FDI given by
ft = (1  ts)f 2 [0; 1] (9)
for i 2 [0; 1].20 Equation (9) shows that either a larger probability of imitation t or a larger
19An example is telecommunications. Although mobile phones represent a more advanced technology
than xed-line phones, mobile phones have become widespread in China before xed-line phones ever have a
chance to do so. In China, the number of mobile-phone subscribers is now more than double the number of
xed-line subscribers. According to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, China has about
300 million xed-line subscribers and 800 million mobile-phone subscribers in 2010.
20A parameter condition (P1) to be stated below will ensure that ft < 1.
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share s of the market to be given away to the imitator reduces the incentives for technology
transfer via FDI.
Proposition 2 A higher rate of imitation (i.e., a larger t) reduces the intensity of FDI.
3.4 Imitation and intellectual property rights
After the foreign rms complete their process of technology transfer, the domestic economy
consists of two types of industries that are occupied by either (a) domestic innovators or
(b) foreign rms. In the case of (a), another domestic individual is randomly chosen as an
imitator, who has the ability to adapt the more advanced foreign technologies from other
industries. We refer to this type of imitation as e¢ cient imitation et.21 In the case of (b), a
domestic individual is randomly chosen as an imitator, who has the ability to imitate existing
foreign technologies in the industry. We refer to this type of imitation as ine¢ cient imitation
t.22 Both types of imitation are random. If the imitation process is successful, then the
imitator takes away (a) the monopolistic position from the domestic innovator in the case
of e¢ cient imitation et or (b) some market share s 2 [0; 1] from the foreign rm in the case
of ine¢ cient imitation t.23 For s = 0, the imitator is unable to take away any market share
from the foreign rm. For s = 1, the imitator takes away the entire market share from the
foreign rm. The general case of s 2 (0; 1) captures the scenario, in which the foreign rm
and the domestic imitator collude and share the monopolistic prot as in Segerstrom (1991).
Under this general case, the domestic imitator is able to take away some market share from
the foreign rm because domestic rms often have a competitive advantage over foreign rms
through local knowledge and local network in developing countries. For example, Branstetter
et al. (2006) note that when a foreign rm "...transfers this knowledge to local employees,
there is a risk that these employees will defect to a local manufacturer, taking sensitive
technology with them. These employees are able to combine the patented and unpatented
elements of the rmstechnology, e¤ectively competing with it in the local market."
The return to e¢ cient imitation is  bAt(i). To achieve an e¢ cient imitation with proba-
bility et in industry i, the imitator has to devote Et(i) units of nal goods to imitative R&D.
21We call this e¢ cient imitation because it raises the level of technology in the industry.
22We call this ine¢ cient imitation because it contributes nothing to the industrys level of technology.
23Similarly, we can also introduce another prot-sharing parameter between domestic innovators and
domestic imitators without changing our main results. However, we think it is more natural for the domestic
imitators, who have imitated the more advanced foreign technologies from other industries, to force out the
domestic innovators who possess less advanced technologies.
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Again, we consider a simple quadratic cost function given by
Et(i) = t
(et)
2
2e
bAt(i), (10)
where e is a productivity parameter for e¢ cient imitation and t 2 (0;1) is a policy variable
determining the level of patent protection at time t. This formulation captures the idea that
a stronger system of patent protection (i.e., a larger t) makes imitation more di¢ cult and
potentially improves intellectual appropriability by domestic innovators. The expected prot
from e¢ cient imitation is et bAt(i) Et(i). Simple di¤erentiation yields the probability of a
successful e¢ cient imitation in industry i given by
et = minfe=t; 1g (11)
for i 2 [0; 1].
The return to ine¢ cient imitation is s bAt(i). To achieve an ine¢ cient imitation with
probability t in industry i, the imitator has to devote It(i) units of nal goods to imitative
R&D. Again, we consider a simple quadratic cost function given by
It(i) = t
(t)
2
2
bAt(i), (12)
where  is a productivity parameter for ine¢ cient imitation. This formulation captures the
idea that a stronger system of patent protection makes the imitation of foreign technologies
more di¢ cult and improves intellectual appropriability by foreign rms. The expected prot
is ts bAt(i)   It(i). Simple di¤erentiation yields the probability of a successful ine¢ cient
imitation in industry i given by
t = minfs=t; 1g (13)
for i 2 [0; 1].
Proposition 3 A stronger system of patent protection (i.e., a larger t) reduces both types
of imitation.
Proposition 3 shows that stronger patent protection reduces both e¢ cient and ine¢ cient
imitations. The reduction in ine¢ cient imitation increases foreign technology transfer via
FDI from Proposition 2. As for domestic innovation, stronger patent protection has a direct
positive e¤ect by reducing e¢ cient imitation and an indirect negative e¤ect by increasing
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FDI. In (5), the probability pt is given by ft + (1   ft)et. In other words, at the time
of innovation, a domestic innovator may be subsequently displaced by a foreign rm with
probability ft or by a domestic imitator with probability (1   ft)et. Di¤erentiating pt =
ft + (1  ft)et with respect to t yields
@pt
@t
= (1  et) @ft
@t
>0
+ (1  ft) @et
@t
<0
. (14)
Equation (14) shows that a larger t increases pt through ft (i.e., the displacement e¤ect of
foreign technologies) and decreases pt through et (i.e., the direct e¤ect of reducing domestic
imitation). Applying (9), (11) and (13), we nd that
@pt
@t
< 0() t > 1
2s

s2
e
  1  f
f

. (15)
Recall that domestic innovation t is decreasing in pt from Proposition 1. Therefore, if
and only if (15) holds, then patent strength t would have a monotonically positive e¤ect
on domestic innovation t. In other words, for a su¢ ciently small t (or equivalently, a
su¢ ciently large t), it is possible for @t=@t to become negative (i.e., @pt=@t > 0)
implying an inverted-U e¤ect of t on domestic innovation t. The negative e¤ect of patent
protection on domestic innovation arises from the displacement e¤ect of foreign technology
transfer via FDI.
For a developing country, it is unlikely that the level of patent protection has reached this
level.24 Therefore, we impose the following su¢ cient condition to ensure that @t=@t > 0
for t 2 (0;1). This parameter condition is given by
f <
1
(1 + s2=e)
, (P1)
which in turn implies f < 1=.25 For the rest of the analysis, we assume that (P1) holds,
so that the e¤ect of patent protection on domestic innovation is monotonically positive.
However, due to its negative e¤ect on technology transfer through imitation, we will show
that the overall e¤ect of patent protection on economic growth follows an inverted-U shape
that is consistent with recent empirical evidence as discussed before.
24See for example Park (2008b) for a survey of empirical studies on patent strength and innovation. Upon
surveying the empirical literature, Park (2008b) concludes that although an inverted-U e¤ect of patent
strength on innovation is theoretically plausible, empirical evidence seems to suggest that the level of patent
protection in most countries is still on the upward-sloping side of the curve.
25This condition is su¢ cient for ft < 1 in (9).
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Proposition 4 Given (P1), a stronger system of patent protection (i.e., a larger t) has a
positive e¤ect on domestic innovation in the developing country.
3.5 Aggregation
At the beginning of time t, the level of technology is industry i is At 1(i). Then, the domestic
innovator increases the level of technology to eAt(i). After that, if either a foreign rm or
a domestic imitator succeeds in transferring foreign technologies into industry i, then the
level of technology would further increase to bAt(i). The transfer of foreign technologies
succeeds with probability ft while the e¢ cient imitation of foreign technologies succeeds
with probability et. Using the law of large numbers, we derive the following law of motion
for aggregate technology At 
R
At(i)di in the developing country.
At = [ft + (1  ft)et]gAt 1 + (1 + t)At 1. (16)
Intuitively, (16) states that the industries experience an average productivity improvement by
tAt 1 through domestic innovation and a fraction ft+(1 ft)et of the industries experiences
an additional productivity improvement by gAt 1 through either FDI or e¢ cient imitation.
The aggregate production function can be obtained by substituting Pt(i) = 1= and (2)
into (1) to derive
Yt = At, (17)
where   2=(1 ) is a composite parameter. The resource constraint for nal goods is
Yt = Ct +Xt +Rt + Et + It + Ft +NXt, (18)
where (a) Ct is aggregate consumption, (b) Xt is the total amount of nal goods used in the
production of intermediate goods, (c) Rt is aggregate innovative R&D, (d) Et is aggregate
expenditure on e¢ cient imitation, (e) It is aggregate expenditure on ine¢ cient imitation, (f)
Ft is aggregate expenditure on FDI, and (g) NXt is net export. Using Pt(i) = 1= and (2),
we obtain
Xt = 
2=(1 )At. (19)
From (4), aggregate innovative R&D is
Rt =
(t)


At 1. (20)
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From (10), aggregate expenditure on e¢ cient imitation is
Et = (1  ft)t (et)
2
2e
[(1 + t)At 1 + g
At 1]. (21)
From (12), aggregate expenditure on ine¢ cient imitation is
It = ftt
(t)
2
2
[(1 + t)At 1 + g
At 1]. (22)
From (8), aggregate expenditure on FDI is
Ft =
(ft)
2
2f
[(1 + t)At 1 + g
At 1]. (23)
As for the net export of nal goods, it is given by
NXt =

ft(1  ts)   (ft)
2
2f

[(1 + t)At 1 + g
At 1]. (24)
In other words, the domestic economy exports goods to pay for the monopolistic prots (net
of FDI expenditure) earned by foreign rms. Finally, aggregate consumption is
Ct = (1  2)At   (Rt + Et + It + Ft +NXt). (25)
3.6 Convergence
If we dene at  At=At as an inverse measure of the developing countrys distance to the
world technology frontier, then the law of motion for at is
at = [ft + (1  ft)et]

g
1 + g

+

1 + t
1 + g

at 1  H(at 1). (26)
Equation (26) is plotted in Figure 1 for a constant value of .
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Figure 1 - Convergence and Distance to Frontier
In this case, at converges to a unique steady-state value given by
a =
f + (1  f)e
1  =g . (27)
To ensure that a 2 (0; 1), we naturally assume
g >

1  p =
()1=( 1)
(1  p)( 2)=( 1) , (P2)
where p = f + (1  f)e. At the steady state, the developing country grows at the same rate
as the world technology frontier despite the fact that the step size of domestic innovation  is
smaller than g. However, if the developing country fails to obtain foreign technologies (i.e.,
f = e = 0), then it would diverge from the rest of the world because domestic innovation
alone is insu¢ cient for the country to catch up with the world technology frontier. Further-
more, (27) shows that stronger patent protection has opposing e¤ects on the steady-state
level of distance to frontier. On the one hand, a larger  stimulates domestic innovation
 and FDI f implying a positive e¤ect on a. On the other hand, it discourages e¢ cient
imitation e implying a negative e¤ect on a.
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4 Stage-dependent IPR protection
The growth rate of technology in the developing country at time t is
gt  At
At 1
  1 = pt g

at 1
+ t, (28)
where pt = ft + (1   ft)et. This equation shows that for a backward country (i.e., a small
at 1), obtaining foreign technologies through pt (i.e., FDI and e¢ cient imitation) is relatively
important for achieving a higher growth rate. In contrast, for an advanced country (i.e., a
large at 1), domestic innovation t becomes relatively important. Di¤erentiating (28) with
respect to pt yields
@gt
@pt
=
g
at 1
  ()
1=( 1)
(   1)(1  pt)( 2)=( 1) , (29)
@2gt
@p2t
=   ()
1=( 1)(   2)
(   1)2(1  pt)1+( 2)=( 1) < 0. (30)
The second-order condition implies that the growth rate gt in the developing country is
globally concave in pt, whereas the rst-order condition implies a growth-maximizing p
g
t
given by
pgt = 1 

()1=( 1)
(   1)
at 1
g
( 1)=( 2)
2 (0; 1), (31)
which is decreasing in at 1 and increasing in g. To see that p
g
t > 0 for any at 1 < 1,
g >
()1=( 1)
(1  p)( 2)=( 1) >
()1=( 1)
(   1) >
()1=( 1)
(   1) at 1, (32)
where the rst inequality follows from (P2), and the second inequality follows from 1  p <
(   1)( 1)=( 2), where  > 2.
Because pt = ft + (1   ft)et 2 [f; 1], the following parameter condition ensures that
there exists a value of t 2 (0;1) that equates pt = pgt .
f <
pgt

. (P3)
In other words, the growth-maximizing pgt can be mapped into a unique level of growth-
maximizing patent strength gt that is increasing in at 1 because pt is monotonically de-
creasing in t given (P1). Intuitively, the growth-maximizing level of patent protection
increases as the developing country evolves toward the world technology frontier. This nd-
ing of a stage-dependent growth-maximizing patent protection is driven by the property that
the relative importance between foreign technologies and domestic innovation on the devel-
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oping countrys growth rate changes endogenously as it evolves towards the world technology
frontier. Also, it is interesting to note that in the case of an increase in g, pgt increases and
gt decreases for a given at 1. Intuitively, when the technology frontier grows at a faster
rate, it is more e¢ cient for the developing country to imitate foreign technologies than to
invest in domestic innovation by implementing a weaker patent system.
Proposition 5 As a developing country evolves towards the world technology frontier, the
growth-maximizing patent strength increases over time. In addition, for a given stage of de-
velopment, the growth-maximizing patent strength is decreasing in the growth rate of frontier
technology.
4.1 Quantitative analysis
As for the welfare-maximizing patent strength, we consider a government that chooses t as
a function of at 1 to maximize aggregate welfare of current and future individuals given byP1
t=1 
t 1Ut, where Ut 
R
ujtdj. The assumption of risk neutrality implies that aggregate
welfare of individuals at time t is simply given by aggregate consumption at time t (i.e.,
Ut = Ct). Substituting (20) - (24) into (25) yields
Ct = [(1  2)pt   t]gAt 1 +

(1  2)  (t)

(1 + t)
  t

(1 + t)At 1, (33)
where t  (1  ft)t(et)2=(2e) + ftt(t)2=(2) + ft(1  ts). The governments objective
is
max
t
1X
t=1
t 1Ct = A0max
t
1X
t=1
[(1 + g)]t 1 ct, (34)
where ct  Ct=At 1. Using (33), we can rearrange terms to obtain
ct = [(1  2)pt   t]g +

(1  2)  (t)

(1 + t)
  t

(1 + t)at 1. (35)
Given (34) and (35), we can solve for the socially optimal policy as a time-invariant dynamic
programming, using the following Bellman equation.
v(at 1) = max
t
ct + (1 + g
)v(at), (36)
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where the law of motion for at is given by (26). Substituting (26) and (35) into (36), we
derive an expression only in at 1, parameters, and policy variable t. Given the analytical
complexity of this problem, we consider a numerical approach (described in Appendix A) to
simulate the welfare-maximizing path of patent strength ut .
To facilitate the simulation, we calibrate the parameters using empirical moments, such
as labor share, output growth, consumption and FDI of the Chinese economy. The model fea-
tures the following parameters fg; ; ; s; ; e; ; f ; g and variables fat 1;tg. We consider
20 years in a generation. For the (inverse) distance-to-frontier variable, we set at 1 = 0:11 to
capture the relative labor productivity between China and the US in 2005. For the growth
rate of frontier technologies, we set g = (1 + 1:5%)20   1 to capture the long-run average
annual TFP growth rate in the US. For the discount factor, we set  to match an annual
discount rate of 10% to ensure that utility is bounded despite the high growth rate in China.
For the labor share 1 , we set  to 0.6 to match the 40% labor share of GDP in China.26
For the prot-sharing parameter between foreign rms and domestic imitative rms, we set
s = 0:5 as a benchmark and also consider s 2 f0; 1g for robustness check. For the innovation
parameter, we set  = 1 as a benchmark and also consider other values  2 f0:5; 2g for
robustness check. For the imitation parameters, we set e = 1 and consider the symmetric
case of  = e as a benchmark, but we also consider  2 f0:5e; 2eg for robustness check. For
the FDI parameter, we set f = 9. Finally, for the curvature parameter in the innovation cost
function, we set  = 5. Given these parameter values, the optimal value of ut evaluated at
at 1 = 0:11 is 0.053. With this complete set of parameter values, we can then compute the
following moments from the model and compare them to the data of the Chinese economy.
We nd that from the model, the annual growth rate of output is 7.5%, consumption as
a share of GDP is 0.49, and FDI as a share of GDP is 0.032. These calibrated moments
are in line with the data on China from the Penn World Table and the World Development
Indicators.
Using the above parameter values, we simulate the optimal path of IPR policy ut and
nd that it is increasing in at 1. This nding is also robust to other parameter values.
Hence, these numerical simulations indicate that our theoretical prediction on the growth-
maximizing policy also applies to the welfare-maximizing policy. In Figure 2, we show our
benchmark simulation outcome.
26See for example Luo and Zhang (2010) for data on labor share in China.
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Figure 2 - Optimal IPR Policy
5 Extensions
In this section, we consider two extensions of the baseline model. In the rst extension,
we consider the case in which the domestic economy imports both frontier and previously
developed technologies from abroad. In the second extension, we consider the case in which
the domestic innovators may strategically choose a more drastic innovation to deter the entry
of foreign rms. In summary, our main result of stage-dependent patent protection remains
robust to each of these extensions.
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5.1 Transfer of foreign technologies
In this subsection, we consider the case in which frontier technologies and also previously
developed technologies that have not been adopted by the domestic economy are both im-
portant sources of technology transfer. In this case, we modify (6) to
bAt(i) = eAt(i) + gAt 1 + (At 1   At 1), (37)
where At 1   At 1 is the distance between frontier and domestic levels of technology, and
 > 0 is a parameter determining the importance of this channel of technology transfer.
Under this specication, (16) becomes
At = pt[g
At 1 + (A

t 1   At 1)] + (1 + t)At 1, (38)
where pt = [ft+(1  ft)et]. In other words, in addition to the average productivity improve-
ment by tAt 1 in all industries, a fraction pt of the industries experiences an additional
productivity gain by gAt 1 + (A

t 1   At 1) through either FDI or e¢ cient imitation.
Rearranging terms, we derive from (38) the growth rate of the domestic economy given by
gt  At
At 1
  1 = pt(g
 + )
at 1
+ t   pt. (39)
Di¤erentiating gt with respect to pt yields
@gt
@pt
=
g + 
at 1
  ()
1=( 1)
(   1)(1  pt)( 2)=( 1)   . (40)
Therefore, @2gt=@(pt)2 < 0 continues to be given by (30) as before. Setting @gt=@pt = 0 in
(40) yields the growth-maximizing pgt given by
pgt = 1 

()1=( 1)
(   1)
at 1
g + (1  at 1)
( 1)=( 2)
, (41)
which continues to be decreasing in at 1 and increasing in g. Given that pt = [ft+(1 ft)et]
remains the same as in Section 3 and is strictly decreasing in t, there exists a unique level
of growth-maximizing patent strength gt that is increasing in at 1 and decreasing in g
 as
before.
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5.2 Strategic domestic innovation
In this subsection, we consider an extension in which domestic innovators may strategically
choose a more drastic innovation to deter foreign entry. Specically, we modify (8) as follows.
Ft(i) =
(ft)
2
2f=t
bAt(i), (42)
where we divide f by t to capture in a simple way the mechanism that a more drastic
domestic innovation makes foreign entry more di¢ cult. Taking t as given, the foreign rm
chooses ft to maximize the expected prot of FDI. Simple di¤erentiation yields
ft =
(1  ts)f
t
. (43)
As before, the expected return to R&D is (1 pt)tAt 1(i) Rt(i), where pt = ft+(1 ft)et.
Taking the foreign rms best response in (43) as given, the domestic innovator in industry
i maximizes the expected return to R&D by choosing t. Simple di¤erentiation yields
t = [(1  et)]1=( 1), (44)
where et is given by (11). Given that et is decreasing in patent strength t, t is increasing
in t. Intuitively, stronger patent rights lead to a lower intensity of imitation, which in turn
stimulates domestic innovation. Substituting (44) into (43) yields
ft =
(1  ts)f
[(1  et)]1=( 1) , (45)
where t is given by (13). Given that both et and t are decreasing in t, patent rights have
two opposing e¤ects on FDI ft. On the one hand, stronger patent rights reduce imitation
and increase FDI. On the other hand, stronger patent rights increase domestic innovation
and decrease FDI. Therefore, the overall e¤ect of t on ft is ambiguous.
As before, the growth rate in the domestic economy is
gt = [ft + (1  ft)et] g

at 1
+ t, (46)
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where ft is given by (45) and t is given by (43). Di¤erentiating gt with respect to t yields
@gt
@t
=

(1  et) @ft
@t
+ (1  ft) @et
@t

| {z }
=@pt=@t
g
at 1
+
@t
@t
, (47)
where @et=@t < 0 and @t=@t > 0. @t=@t captures the positive e¤ect of patent protec-
tion on domestic innovation. @pt=@t captures the following e¤ects of patent protection on
foreign technology transfer. First, t has a negative e¤ect on technology transfer through
imitation et. Second, t has the ambiguous e¤ects on technology transfer through FDI ft
as discussed above. If the overall e¤ect of t on foreign technology transfer is positive, then
the e¤ect of t on economic growth would be always positive. However, if the overall e¤ect
of t on foreign technology transfer is negative, then there exists two opposing e¤ects of t
on economic growth. This situation occurs if and only if the following condition holds under
which @pt=@t < 0.
f <
[(1  et)]1=( 1)


(1  et)s
2
e
+ (1  ts)

   2
   1
 1
. (48)
Given (48), the relative importance of the two opposing e¤ects of t on gt is determined
by at 1 (i.e., the inverse distance to frontier). When a country is far away from (close to)
the technology frontier, the negative e¤ect of patent rights on foreign technology transfer
dominates (is dominated by) the positive e¤ect on domestic innovation. This implication
is consistent with our baseline model as well as the stylized facts documented in Section
2. Finally, we have conducted a large number of numerical simulations and nd that the
growth-maximizing t is increasing in at 1.
6 Discussion
In this study, we have developed a simple Schumpeterian growth model of distance to frontier
to analyze the evolution of IPR protection in developing countries. Although our model is
stylized, we believe that it captures the essence of the key issue that is the interrelation
between economic development and optimal IPR protection. Specically, an appropriate
IPR system contributes to the economic development of a country, which in turn determines
the optimal level of IPR protection in the country at a given development stage. In summary,
we nd that the optimal strength of IPR protection increases as a developing country evolves
towards the world technology frontier, and this theoretical nding of stage-dependent IPR
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protection is consistent with the actual evolution of the IPR system in China.
In terms of policy implications, our nding suggests that it is optimal for a developing
country to gradually strengthen its IPR protection. In other words, requiring a developing
country, such as China, to immediately raise its level of patent protection on par with
developed countries would hurt its social welfare. In a National Academy of Sciences report,
Merrill et al. (2004, p. 13) state that "patents exist in most countries, and the degree to which
countries at di¤erent stages of economic development should adhere to the same standards
of patentability, conform to the same rules, and follow the same administrative procedures
is an enormously complex although extremely important set of issues. [...] readers should
not infer that what we recommend for the United States we believe less-developed countries
should adopt." Our nding of stage-dependant optimal IPR policy reiterates their concern
and provides a justication for the WTOs procedure that when the TRIPS Agreement
were implemented in developed countries in 1996, developing countries and least developed
countries were given an extension of 4 years and 11 years respectively to apply the agreements
provisions.
Finally, in the theoretical model, we consider a developing country that takes the world
technology frontier as given. Although it is arguable that technological progress in developed
countries may be a¤ected by the level of IPR protection in developing countries, it is still an
open debate among existing studies (cited in the introduction) as to whether Southern IPR
protection has a positive or negative e¤ect on Northern innovation. Therefore, we leave this
important but controversial issue to future research.
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Appendix A: Numerical solution of the optimal IPR policy
Recall that the governments objective is
max
t
1X
t=1
t 1Ct = A0max
t
1X
t=1
[(1 + g)]t 1 ct,
where ct is given by (35). Given the analytical complexity of this problem, we consider a
numerical approach to solve for the welfare-maximizing path of patent strength. In our nu-
merical analysis, we simulate numerically the value function, v(at 1), and the policy function
G(at 1)  t, adopting a standard value-function iteration method, according to which27:
1. We select a grid of points28 for [0; 1], i.e. the state space of ai, where now i 2 1; :::; N
indexes the i-th point in the grid (not time);
2. We start from an initial guess29 of v0(a);
3. We obtain numerical solutions for
v1i = max
i
ci + (1 + g
)v0(ai)
for all i 2 1; :::; N ;
4. We obtain a (cubic) polynomial spline approximation of v1(a) such that v1(ai) = v1i;
5. We iterate this procedure, this time starting from the new function v1(ai), obtaining
v2i = max
i
ci + (1 + g
)v1(ai)
for all i 2 1; :::; N ;
6. Obtain a polynomial spline approximation of v2(a) such that v2(ai) = v2i: this is
necessary for the maximization to take place in the continuous space [0; 1], thereby admitting
solutions for i corresponding to values of a not necessarily in the chosen grid30;
7. We keep repeating the maximization and approximation, until the change in vni and
in the policy variables does not exceed a tolerance value31.
27All computations have been performed using Matlab. The .m les used are available upon request.
28This number is N = 40 in our simulations.
29Identically equal to zero.
30Otherwise v1(ai) would not be dened.
31of 10 4, and the number of iterations do not exceed a maximum number of loops, set equal to 80 in our
simulations.
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